Voting Matters--Securing our elections Jan 07

With current voting systems a single person in the wrong place could change votes and rig an election. We can’t be certain that past elections haven’t been rigged. Ever wonder why the audit procedures for slot machines are better than voting machines? Let’s look at the Brennan Center Task Force on Voting System Security’s study on voting system vulnerabilities. This study is available at http://www.brennancenter.org

The Task Force divided voting machines into 3 basic types: Direct Recording Electronic (DRE), DRE with Voter Verified Paper Trail (VVPT), and Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS). All three types have significant security and reliability vulnerabilities. Fortunately, the most serious vulnerabilities of each system can be substantially reduced if proper countermeasures are implemented.

Unfortunately, few jurisdictions have implemented any of these countermeasures, and few states have codified any of these countermeasures into law. The Task Force analyzed voting system vulnerabilities and concluded that some apply to all electronic voting systems, and others only to specific technologies. Vulnerabilities common to all systems include insertion of malicious code to change close races and the use of wireless technologies in voting systems. DREs without a paper trail are vulnerable to any kind of electronic attack. For VVPT and PCOS, a paper trail alone is not sufficient; it only has value if an audit procedure is in place. Even with the paper trail and routine audits some attacks cannot be detected.

The Task Force made several recommendations. The first is conduct routine audits of the paper and electronic records after every election using a transparent and random selection process. Next is performing random “parallel” testing of voting machines on Election Day to detect software attacks. On the technology side, they recommend banning wireless components for voting machines. Voting system programming and administration should be decentralized and closely audited. Clear and effective procedures must be in place for reporting and investigating evidence of fraud or error.

On another note, Representative Holt’s H. R. 550, an amendment to the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) to require a voter verified paper trail, is a partial response to the Brennan Center’s recommendations. The Holt Amendment requires a voter verified paper trail for any voting machine, which addresses some of the major concerns of the Brennan Center study, but not all of them. Unfortunately, there is no requirement for independent audit or verification. For a more detailed discussion look on http://www.blackboxvoting.org/

In the next issue I will discuss in greater detail the vulnerability analysis section of this report. This will help in understanding the strengths and weaknesses of proposed legislation both at the state and national level.