I recently attending the Computer Security Institute's NETSEC information security conference in Phoenix. While attending a session on information security metrics, the topic of information security metrics as used by the Australian Electoral Commission came up. Tim Evans, the Director of Election Systems & Policy of the AEC has actually used Risk Analysis methodology to evaluate vendors as part of the procurement process. Interestingly enough, the vendor has to show that the offering meets the business needs of the AEC and will be within acceptable risk parameters.
This seems to be a novel concept in the elections world. Determine what your business needs are, evaluate your vendors against those needs (including security), and then make your purchasing decision based on that type of evaluation. Sure a lot of the elections officials in the USA say they do that, but when you look at the purchasing process it seems better connected to the quality of the lunch the vendor bought, not whether the product meets the needs of the elections department.
The trick is to implement a risk management methodology that brings together the technical people who can identify and mitigate risks with the system owners and users who identify only with the business processes. Obviously fraud control is a risk that must be managed, as is system availability,reliability and even usability. A scan of the AEC's annual reports going back several years shows that risk management is a critical part of the AEC's day to day operations.
I think every elections department should have a formal risk management program, but I bet most don't and won't unless they are forced by law.
Sunday, June 24, 2007
Sunday, April 15, 2007
Voting Matters--Securing our elections Apr 07
The Texas Legislature is considering several pieces of legislation that will affect both voter registration and how we conduct elections. I will give you the highlights of some of the proposals.
On the voter registration side, we have several proposals in committee both in the House in the Senate that are seeking additional proof of ID to register.
SB694, HB265, HB245 -- which propose to allow election day voter registration. States that allow election day voter registration generally show a higher turnout at elections. Bruce Sherbet has pointed out that a deputy voter registrar will be required at each polling place. Currently the county scrambles during every election to provide judges and clerks at all polling places, so the extra personnel are not readily available.
HB101, HB218, HB626, HB979, HB1726, HB2319 -- require proof of citizenship to register to vote and show proof of identification when voting. Similar laws in other southern states have been invalidated by the courts and others are under judicial review. This could have an adverse affect on our voter registration project as well as make voting more difficult for poor and elderly voters. Similar laws in other states have reduced turnout among the poor and elderly.
When it comes to voting, several bills have been filed to make voting easier and electronic voting machines more auditable.
SB946/HB942 -- propose early voting by mail for any qualified voter. Western states such as Washington, California, and Oregon have similar laws in force which have increased voter participation in elections. Current Texas law is fairly restrictive on who can vote by mail, so these proposals would expand the franchise for those who can’t or won’t vote in person. Another proposal is for small jurisdictions to hold entire elections by mail. Jurisdictions that allow anyone to vote by mail have seen participation increase over in person voting.
SB1006, SB1247, SB1647, HB65, HB123, HB384, HB527, HB1364, HB3891, HB3894 -- bills related to the use of direct recording electronic voting machines, conduct of elections, recounts. The most significant impact would be the requirement of a voter verified paper audit trail. Some of the legislation would make the paper trail the official ballot for recounts. Given problems with printers and supplies, this would inevitably cause difficulties. Bruce Sherbet has pointed out that recounting using rolls of paper takes much longer than paper ballot recounts. I suspect none of this legislation will make it out of committee this session as most legislatures are waiting to see what Congress passes first.
This legislative session has seen many election related bills filed, but with only a few weeks left in the session most will not reach the floor for a vote, much less pass in a final form. Legislators do not seem to be under pressure to pass reform legislation either by the courts or constituents. Learn more about pending legislation status: Texas Legislature Online Bill Lookup at http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/BillLookup/BillNumber.aspx
On the voter registration side, we have several proposals in committee both in the House in the Senate that are seeking additional proof of ID to register.
SB694, HB265, HB245 -- which propose to allow election day voter registration. States that allow election day voter registration generally show a higher turnout at elections. Bruce Sherbet has pointed out that a deputy voter registrar will be required at each polling place. Currently the county scrambles during every election to provide judges and clerks at all polling places, so the extra personnel are not readily available.
HB101, HB218, HB626, HB979, HB1726, HB2319 -- require proof of citizenship to register to vote and show proof of identification when voting. Similar laws in other southern states have been invalidated by the courts and others are under judicial review. This could have an adverse affect on our voter registration project as well as make voting more difficult for poor and elderly voters. Similar laws in other states have reduced turnout among the poor and elderly.
When it comes to voting, several bills have been filed to make voting easier and electronic voting machines more auditable.
SB946/HB942 -- propose early voting by mail for any qualified voter. Western states such as Washington, California, and Oregon have similar laws in force which have increased voter participation in elections. Current Texas law is fairly restrictive on who can vote by mail, so these proposals would expand the franchise for those who can’t or won’t vote in person. Another proposal is for small jurisdictions to hold entire elections by mail. Jurisdictions that allow anyone to vote by mail have seen participation increase over in person voting.
SB1006, SB1247, SB1647, HB65, HB123, HB384, HB527, HB1364, HB3891, HB3894 -- bills related to the use of direct recording electronic voting machines, conduct of elections, recounts. The most significant impact would be the requirement of a voter verified paper audit trail. Some of the legislation would make the paper trail the official ballot for recounts. Given problems with printers and supplies, this would inevitably cause difficulties. Bruce Sherbet has pointed out that recounting using rolls of paper takes much longer than paper ballot recounts. I suspect none of this legislation will make it out of committee this session as most legislatures are waiting to see what Congress passes first.
This legislative session has seen many election related bills filed, but with only a few weeks left in the session most will not reach the floor for a vote, much less pass in a final form. Legislators do not seem to be under pressure to pass reform legislation either by the courts or constituents. Learn more about pending legislation status: Texas Legislature Online Bill Lookup at http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/BillLookup/BillNumber.aspx
Sunday, April 01, 2007
Upcoming Candidate Forums
Oak Cliff Conservation League. Dallas Mayoral Forum: April 5th, 5:30-9:30 PM, Hitt Auditorium at Methodist Hospital. 1441 N. Beckley Ave. at W. Colorado.
Kessler Neighbors United neighborhood association: Dallas City Council District 3 candidate forum. Kessler Park United Methodist church, April 30th. Time 7PM. 1215 Turner Ave. at W. Colorado. All 8 candidates have responded, so this will be a good opportunity to listen to them all.
Kessler Neighbors United neighborhood association: Dallas City Council District 3 candidate forum. Kessler Park United Methodist church, April 30th. Time 7PM. 1215 Turner Ave. at W. Colorado. All 8 candidates have responded, so this will be a good opportunity to listen to them all.
Saturday, March 17, 2007
Voting Matters--Securing our elections Mar 07
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) produced a white paper on electronic voting machine vulnerability and made recommendations about accrediting voting machines. Titled Requiring Software Independence in VVSG 2007: STS Recommendations for the TGDC, November 2006 it can be found at http://vote.nist.gov/
The Voluntary Voting Systems Guidelines (VVSG) Version I is available on this site: http://www.eac.gov/vvsg_intro.htm
Why do we care about the VVSG? Well, under the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) voting machines have to be accredited and tested. NIST has studied existing laboratories that the manufacturers have been using. NIST determined that the current proprietary testing is inadequate and needs independent oversight and national test standards.
The concept of software independence in voting systems is a great idea from NIST. The idea is that a detection method (such as audit) independent of the software used to tally the vote will detect errors. NIST was thinking of electronic tools to produce an independent voter verified audit trail. Interesting, but can we trust the manufacturers?
Representative Holt has a bill to reform HAVA that is under consideration in the House. The bill, HR-811, has a several strong points. It requires voter verifiable paper trails and a mandatory audit program. While a lot of observers disagree on the audit techniques, it does require the single most important technique to detect fraud: audits. Some feel that the audit requirements are too detailed and should be described more broadly, but they are better than what we have now.
Critics have identified weaknesses in Holt’s bill as well. One is that it doesn’t require that citizens have full access to voting records or to observe the count. Some states don’t allow voter or candidate access, hence the count is done in secret and ballots cannot be independently examined. Another criticism is the composition of state audit boards does not require mathematicians or statisticians as members. Several loopholes and exceptions to audit requirements are also in the bill that may be abused. Many of the other criticisms of the Holt bill really are arguments about whether it goes far enough. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:h.r.00811:
While the League has not set a position on the Holt bill, it adopted a resolution at the last national convention endorsing voter verified paper ballots or an auditable record. So when discussing the Holt bill, we can confidently say that the League endorses both a paper record of the vote and an audit protocol to ensure fair elections. Many of the other provisions of the Holt bill are subject to disagreement, but if we stick to the two items above, we will have strong influence on our representatives.
As an interesting test case, New Mexico switched from direct recording electronic voting machines in 2004 to paper based optical scan systems in 2006. In Native American and Hispanic areas the undervote rate dropped by 69-85%. As I mentioned in previous columns one of the major problems with DREs is that they have little or no undervote protection, whereas optical scan readers can detect and reject a ballot immediately if an under or over vote is detected. It should make us all wonder what the 2004 elections would have been like if they were all conducted on paper ballots. For a little light reading, here is the link: http://www.votersunite.org/info/NM_UVbyBallotTypeandEthnicity.pdf
The Voluntary Voting Systems Guidelines (VVSG) Version I is available on this site: http://www.eac.gov/vvsg_intro.htm
Why do we care about the VVSG? Well, under the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) voting machines have to be accredited and tested. NIST has studied existing laboratories that the manufacturers have been using. NIST determined that the current proprietary testing is inadequate and needs independent oversight and national test standards.
The concept of software independence in voting systems is a great idea from NIST. The idea is that a detection method (such as audit) independent of the software used to tally the vote will detect errors. NIST was thinking of electronic tools to produce an independent voter verified audit trail. Interesting, but can we trust the manufacturers?
Representative Holt has a bill to reform HAVA that is under consideration in the House. The bill, HR-811, has a several strong points. It requires voter verifiable paper trails and a mandatory audit program. While a lot of observers disagree on the audit techniques, it does require the single most important technique to detect fraud: audits. Some feel that the audit requirements are too detailed and should be described more broadly, but they are better than what we have now.
Critics have identified weaknesses in Holt’s bill as well. One is that it doesn’t require that citizens have full access to voting records or to observe the count. Some states don’t allow voter or candidate access, hence the count is done in secret and ballots cannot be independently examined. Another criticism is the composition of state audit boards does not require mathematicians or statisticians as members. Several loopholes and exceptions to audit requirements are also in the bill that may be abused. Many of the other criticisms of the Holt bill really are arguments about whether it goes far enough. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:h.r.00811:
While the League has not set a position on the Holt bill, it adopted a resolution at the last national convention endorsing voter verified paper ballots or an auditable record. So when discussing the Holt bill, we can confidently say that the League endorses both a paper record of the vote and an audit protocol to ensure fair elections. Many of the other provisions of the Holt bill are subject to disagreement, but if we stick to the two items above, we will have strong influence on our representatives.
As an interesting test case, New Mexico switched from direct recording electronic voting machines in 2004 to paper based optical scan systems in 2006. In Native American and Hispanic areas the undervote rate dropped by 69-85%. As I mentioned in previous columns one of the major problems with DREs is that they have little or no undervote protection, whereas optical scan readers can detect and reject a ballot immediately if an under or over vote is detected. It should make us all wonder what the 2004 elections would have been like if they were all conducted on paper ballots. For a little light reading, here is the link: http://www.votersunite.org/info/NM_UVbyBallotTypeandEthnicity.pdf
Tuesday, February 06, 2007
Voting Matters--Securing our elections Jan 07
With current voting systems a single person in the wrong place could change votes and rig an election. We can’t be certain that past elections haven’t been rigged. Ever wonder why the audit procedures for slot machines are better than voting machines? Let’s look at the Brennan Center Task Force on Voting System Security’s study on voting system vulnerabilities. This study is available at http://www.brennancenter.org
The Task Force divided voting machines into 3 basic types: Direct Recording Electronic (DRE), DRE with Voter Verified Paper Trail (VVPT), and Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS). All three types have significant security and reliability vulnerabilities. Fortunately, the most serious vulnerabilities of each system can be substantially reduced if proper countermeasures are implemented.
Unfortunately, few jurisdictions have implemented any of these countermeasures, and few states have codified any of these countermeasures into law. The Task Force analyzed voting system vulnerabilities and concluded that some apply to all electronic voting systems, and others only to specific technologies. Vulnerabilities common to all systems include insertion of malicious code to change close races and the use of wireless technologies in voting systems. DREs without a paper trail are vulnerable to any kind of electronic attack. For VVPT and PCOS, a paper trail alone is not sufficient; it only has value if an audit procedure is in place. Even with the paper trail and routine audits some attacks cannot be detected.
The Task Force made several recommendations. The first is conduct routine audits of the paper and electronic records after every election using a transparent and random selection process. Next is performing random “parallel” testing of voting machines on Election Day to detect software attacks. On the technology side, they recommend banning wireless components for voting machines. Voting system programming and administration should be decentralized and closely audited. Clear and effective procedures must be in place for reporting and investigating evidence of fraud or error.
On another note, Representative Holt’s H. R. 550, an amendment to the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) to require a voter verified paper trail, is a partial response to the Brennan Center’s recommendations. The Holt Amendment requires a voter verified paper trail for any voting machine, which addresses some of the major concerns of the Brennan Center study, but not all of them. Unfortunately, there is no requirement for independent audit or verification. For a more detailed discussion look on http://www.blackboxvoting.org/
In the next issue I will discuss in greater detail the vulnerability analysis section of this report. This will help in understanding the strengths and weaknesses of proposed legislation both at the state and national level.
The Task Force divided voting machines into 3 basic types: Direct Recording Electronic (DRE), DRE with Voter Verified Paper Trail (VVPT), and Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS). All three types have significant security and reliability vulnerabilities. Fortunately, the most serious vulnerabilities of each system can be substantially reduced if proper countermeasures are implemented.
Unfortunately, few jurisdictions have implemented any of these countermeasures, and few states have codified any of these countermeasures into law. The Task Force analyzed voting system vulnerabilities and concluded that some apply to all electronic voting systems, and others only to specific technologies. Vulnerabilities common to all systems include insertion of malicious code to change close races and the use of wireless technologies in voting systems. DREs without a paper trail are vulnerable to any kind of electronic attack. For VVPT and PCOS, a paper trail alone is not sufficient; it only has value if an audit procedure is in place. Even with the paper trail and routine audits some attacks cannot be detected.
The Task Force made several recommendations. The first is conduct routine audits of the paper and electronic records after every election using a transparent and random selection process. Next is performing random “parallel” testing of voting machines on Election Day to detect software attacks. On the technology side, they recommend banning wireless components for voting machines. Voting system programming and administration should be decentralized and closely audited. Clear and effective procedures must be in place for reporting and investigating evidence of fraud or error.
On another note, Representative Holt’s H. R. 550, an amendment to the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) to require a voter verified paper trail, is a partial response to the Brennan Center’s recommendations. The Holt Amendment requires a voter verified paper trail for any voting machine, which addresses some of the major concerns of the Brennan Center study, but not all of them. Unfortunately, there is no requirement for independent audit or verification. For a more detailed discussion look on http://www.blackboxvoting.org/
In the next issue I will discuss in greater detail the vulnerability analysis section of this report. This will help in understanding the strengths and weaknesses of proposed legislation both at the state and national level.
Voting Matters--Securing our elections Feb 07
Last month I discussed some of the key points of the Brennan Center Task Force on Voting System Security’s study on voting system vulnerabilities. This study is available at http://www.brennancenter.org This month we’ll look a bit more at which threats the
Remember the common vulnerabilities among all electronic voting machines? If the goal is to change a close election it is easiest to install attack software or corrupt programs. Furthermore, if a voting machine has a wireless access it is far more vulnerable to attack.
For voting machines without voter verified paper trails, there is no way to independently audit the results. If the voting machine does have a paper trail, or is an optical scan machine, it is useless without an audit process.
The threat is real: installing software or corrupting programs requires very few participants and can easily swing a close election. It requires installing software, perhaps during the setup or calibration of a machine, in order to selectively miscount the results. It could even be loaded or triggered by the wireless component of a machine. For your average election judge it would be an invisible attack.
Voter verified paper trails are another problem. Several studies have shown that few voters will verify their own ballots. Unfortunately, without a mandatory audit program it is unlikely that fraud or error will be caught by the voter. Of course a smart programmer can also modify the paper and electronic tallies at the same time. If the voter even notices, they may just assume that they made the mistake.
Precinct count optical scan machines show the highest accuracy and reliability, but central count optical scanners are subject to fraud and error at the central counting station. The former have under and over vote protection; the latter do not.
The best protections are a combination of testing and audit strategies. On Election Day, testing randomly selected voting machines should be routine. In addition, audit the paper trail and match it to the electronic tally. With multi-day early voting in
Some facts to think over prior to lobby day in
Next month I will review the National Institute of Standards and Technology white paper on voting machine vulnerability and recommendations about accrediting voting machines. http://vote.nist.gov/
Saturday, August 19, 2006
People Empowerment Project--Volunteers Wanted!
Government Belongs to Us!
A Civics Project to Encourage Youth Voting
The People Empowerment Project (PEP) is seeking volunteers to work with student council programs. PEP is working with Dallas County Elections, Dallas ISD, Lancaster ISD, and the Dallas CAN! Academy to teach kids civics through participation in their own school’s student council. We need volunteers to work with the kids in schools all over
Help us and the student council sponsors teach:
- Government structure
- How to run a campaign
- How to vote and conduct elections
- Public speaking
- Developing legislation
- Meeting with elected officials
Volunteers should expect to spend about 70-100 hours during the school year helping the student council program. Volunteers will be trained and assisted by the PEP staff.
- 3 hour Orientation training session
- Training session with students – average 2 hours in August/early September
- Election day - one full day at the school, possibly including picking up/returning materials to the Eelection Dept – mid-September
- Issue surveys – a full day at school in October
- Attending Student Council meetings (especially first three) – time frame varies at each school but duration of meeting is usually 2 hours – Sept/Oct
- End of year meetings/spring election – four to eight hours April/May
For more information, please contact Suzanne Hickman suzannezhickman@aol.com or call the office.
Location: People Empowerment Project
214-824-3107
Please, help us make a difference in a kid’s life. Call and volunteer.
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